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BANKRUPTCY-PRIORITIES-Internal Revenue Code
Provision Making Withheld Taxes a Trust for Govern-
ment Held Not to Supersede Bankruptcy Act Priorities
Which Give All Costs of Administration Pro Rata First
Priority
On August 18, 1967, Halo Metal Products, Inc., filed a petition for
an arrangement in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois' under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act.2 Pur-
suant to the plan of arrangement, Halo was allowed to remain in
possession of its assets under the supervision of the court. Halo was to
file monthly reports with the court, keep separate books and records of
its operations as of the date the petition was filed, and maintain separate
bank accounts for its general, payroll, and tax indebtedness, making
necessary disbursements from those accounts as the debts matured.
On November 22, 1967, Halo was adjudicated a bankrupt, and its
assets were sold. During the approximately three month period in
which Halo operated as a debtor-in-possession under the Chapter XI
arrangement, it had failed to file the monthly reports and to set up the
separate bank accounts. Income and social security taxes withheld
from employees by Halo were neither paid over to the government nor
set aside as required.
The United States sought to have a trust imposed in its favor on
$1,075.02 from the bankrupt's estate, this amount representing the
money the government claims was withheld from employees' wages but
not paid over to the United States. The basis for the government's
trust theory is Section 7501 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 19541
which states:
General Rule-Whenever any person is required to collect or
withhold any internal revenue tax from any other person and to
pay over such tax to the United States, the amount of tax so
collected or withheld shall be held to be a special fund in trust for
the United States. The amount of such fund shall be assessed,
collected, and paid in the same manner and subject to the same
provisions and limitations (including penalties) as are applicable
with respect to the taxes from which such fund arose.
1. The Chapter XI arrangement is a bankruptcy procedure whereby an insolvent
debtor is given an opportunity to resolve his financial difficulties. Upon the agreement
of the majority of his creditors to a plan of arrangement the debtor is allowed to re-
main in the possession of his assets under the supervision and control of the bankruptcy
court.
2. 11 U.S.C.A. § 701 et seq. (1964).
3. 26 U.S.C.A. § 7501(a) (1964).
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It is the government's contention that by virtue of Section 7501 (a)
the trustee in bankruptcy takes the assets of the bankrupt subject to a
trust in the amount of tax money withheld and must make payment
of the trust property prior to any distribution under the Bankruptcy
Act.
The trustee, on the other hand, seeks to have the government's claim
for taxes share pro rata first priority with other administrative expenses
incurred during the Chapter XI arrangement. 4 Section 64 (a)(1) of
the Bankruptcy Act, establishes priorities in bankruptcy and gives first
priority to costs of administration.5
Substantially all of the funds remaining in the bankrupt's estate were
derived from the court ordered sale of Halo's assets. Full payment of
the government's tax claim would leave only a few hundred dollars in
the estate and as a result the other administrative expense claims would
remain substantially unpaid.
Thus the basic issue which the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
United States v. Randall6 confronted is whether the United States is
entitled to a "super-priority" over other costs of administration by virtue
of Section 7501 of the Internal Revenue Code.
HELD: The United States is not entitled to a super-priority over other
4. Debts incurred by a trustee in bankruptcy or by a debtor-in-possession under
an arrangement while operating the business under the supervision of the bankruptcy
court are costs of administration. Thus taxes assessed against the business after the
filing of the petition are included among claims having first priority under § 64(a)
(1). Missouri v. Earhart, 111 F.2d 992 (8th Cir. 1940).
5. 11 U.S.C.A. § 104(a) (1964):
Debts which have priority.
(a) The debts to have priority, in advance, of the payment of dividends to
creditors, and to be paid in full out of the bankrupt estates, and the order of
payment shall be (1) the costs and expenses of administration ...
Where an order is entered in a proceeding under any Chapter of this title
directing that bankruptcy be proceeded with, the costs and expenses of ad-
administration incurred in the ensuing bankruptcy proceeding . .. shall have
priority in advance of payment of the unpaid costs and expenses of adminis-
tration, including the allowances provided for in such chapter, incurred in the
superseded proceeding and in the suspended bankruptcy proceeding, if any;
6. United States v. Randall, 419 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1969).
7. The term "super-priority" was used by the Randall court. It is submitted that
the term does not clearly describe the relationship between the tax trust and the
§ 64(a) priorities under the government's theory.
A valid trust creates a prior right to payment independent of the Bankruptcy Act.
A "priority" in bankruptcy refers to the order of precedence established by the Bank-
ruptcy Act for the distribution of the bankrupt's remaining assets. Thus, what the
government sought was preferred payment independent of the priorities established in
the Bankruptcy Act, not a super-priority in the technical sense. Use of the term does
suggest the court's ultimate conclusion, that the statutorily created trust was not recog-
nizable in bankruptcy so as to create a priority not intended by the Bankruptcy Act.
Similarly, in cases reaching an opposite conclusion, discussed infra, those courts refer to
the payment as "direct restitution", a term which is equally non-technical and sug-
gestive of their ultimate conclusion.
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administrative expense claims for tax money withheld but not paid over
to the government. Taxes incurred during the Chapter XI arrange-
ment, including money withheld from employees for income and social
security taxes not turned over to the government, share a pro rata first
priority with all other administrative expenses under the terms of Sec-
tion 64 (a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Act. The court determined: 1.)
That the second sentence of Section 7501 (a) which requires tax trust
be "... assessed, collected, and paid in the same manner and subject
to the same provisions and limitations" as the taxes from which it arose,
makes the trust fund subject to the priorities established by Section
64 (a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Act; and 2.) Even if Section 7501 was
not so construed, the priority which it establishes is overridden by the
strong policies of the Bankruptcy Act, which Act is controlling in mat-
ters regarding bankruptcy.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals thus took a position contrary
to the decisions of three other United States courts of appeals on facts
substantially identical to the instant case .8  The court discussed the
ample line of authority which has upheld the government's tax trust
theory in similar situations and then stated its basis for taking an oppos-
ing view.
The first decision upholding a statutory tax trust was City of New
York v. Rassner.9 In Rassner, a debtor-in-possession under a Chapter
XI arrangement collected a New York City sales tax from its customers
but commingled the funds. When the debtor became bankrupt, the
only substantial assets remaining were funds derived from the trustee's
invalidation of a chattel mortgage. A city sales tax law made a vendor
a "trustee" for sales tax money collected from vendees. The city asked
for payment in full of all post-bankruptcy taxes collected, while the
trustee sought a pro rata distribution for all administrative expense
claims, including such taxes, pursuant to Section 64(a)(1) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act.
The referee had ruled the city must share pro rata with other admin-
istrative expenses because the funds left in the estate were the result of
the trustee's efforts and not derived from the collection of sales tax and
because the city was not able to trace the trust fund. The district
court in Rassner affirmed for both reasons, and added that the city's
8. City of New York v. Rassner, 127 F.2d 703 (2nd Cir. 1942); United States v.
Sampsell, 193 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1951); Hercules Service Parts Corp. v. United States,
202 F.2d 938 (6th Cir. 1953); In re Airline Arista Printing Corp., 156 F. Supp. 403
(S.D.N.Y. 1957), af 'd. per curiam, 267 F.2d 333 (2nd Cir. 1959).
9. 127 F.2d 703 (2nd Cir. 1942).
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claim was for taxes, not a trust fund, and thus the Bankruptcy Act
priorities should apply.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. While the
question of proper distribution is federal, state law determines when a
trust relationship exists. Admitting that a strong policy of the Bank-
ruptcy Act would override state law, the court determined that "the
generalities of § 64, subd. a (1)"10 did not override the general appli-
cation of state law regarding the existence of and the preference ac-
corded a trust.
In regard to the necessity of tracing trust property, the court con-
ceded that a beneficiary must trace funds where mingling takes place
prior to bankruptcy. However, it distinguished that situation from one
where the trust arose subsequent to an arrangement proceeding. When
the debtor filed his petition and was granted leave by the court to con-
tinue in possession, he was thereafter acting as an officer of the bank-
ruptcy court" and was subject to the control of that court. If the debtor
commingled trust property under these circumstances, the court's con-
trol would be a defense in an action by the city against him for breach
of his fiduciary duty as trustee. The court's conclusion was that:
If we hold that the city must now trace the funds, we state in
effect that any beneficiary of a trust which is handled by an officer
of a bankruptcy court must always protect himself by petitioning
in .advance for proper administration of the trust. Thus stated,
it can be seen that we would be condoning improper action by a
trustee so long as he could successfully get away with it. As a court
of equity, a court can hardly proceed on this assumption. It is the
duty of the bankruptcy court in distributing an estate to do so
equitably. 12
In United States v. Sampsell,13 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
considered a similar claim by the United States for direct restitution of
money withheld from employees as income and social security tax by a
debtor-in-possession under an arrangement. The statute invoked was
Section 3661 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1938 which contained
the same provisions as Section 7501 (a) of the 1954 Code. The only
issue the court discussed was whether the government's inability to trace
trust property would be fatal to its claim.' 4 The Ninth Circuit followed
New York City v. Rassner in finding that the necessity of tracing does
10. 127 F.2d at 707.
11. 11 U.S.C.A. § 742, 743 (1964).
12. 127 F.2d at 706.
13. 193 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1951).
14. The Referee had disallowed the government's claim on this ground and the
district court affirmed.
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not arise where the commingling debtor is an officer of the court. 15
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also adopted the Rassner rationale
in Hercules Service Parts Corp. v. United States.16 The pertinent facts
in Hercules are substantially identical to those in Sampsell and Randall.
Unlike Sampsell, however, the court was confronted with a second issue,
whether acceptance of the government's claim nullifies Section
64(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Act. In regard to the issue of tracing,
the court repeated the Rassner and Sampsell rationales. The court
dismissed the trustee's second contention, stating: "We agree with the
Second Circuit in the Rassner case, supra, that the allowing of a pri-
ority to the government here does not violate the 'generalities' of Section
64 of the Bankruptcy Act.' 7
In re Airline Arista Printing Corp."8 reaffirmed Rassner in the Sec-
ond Circuit and applied it to a Section 7501 trust of withholding taxes.
The trustee in Airline Arista relied on the 1952 amendment to Section
64(a)(1) which gives the administrative expenses of an ensuing bank-
ruptcy proceeding priority over administrative expenses incurred during
a superseded arrangement. On the basis of this amendment, the trustee
moved for an order directing that expenses of administration incurred
in the bankruptcy proceeding be paid prior to administrative expenses
of the superseded Chapter XI arrangement, including claims for taxes.
The district court held, and the Second Circuit affirmed, that the
amendment to 64(a)(1) did not control the disposition of property in
bankruptcy pursuant to a trust; and the amendment did not evidence
an overriding policy which would alter the Rassner rationale.
Having set out the decisions from other circuits in which cases of
almost identical factual content were confronted, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals in United States v. Randall 9 determined not to follow
their reasoning. It is worthy of note, however, that none of the cases
which followed City of New York v. Rassner and applied its holding
to the trust created by Section 7501 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code
or its predecessor, confronted the issue which the Randall court felt
was conclusive of the case. The second sentence of 7501 (a), cited
earlier, states: "The amount of such [trust] fund shall be assessed,
collected, and paid in the same manner and subject to the same provi-
sions and limitations (including penalties) as are applicable with re-
15. 193 F.2d at 156.
16. 202 F.2d 938 (6th Cir. 1953).
17. 202 F.2d at 941.
18. 156 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd per curiam, 267 F.2d 333 (2nd Cir.
1959).
19. 419 F.2d at 1070-1071.
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spect to the taxes from which such fund arose." The court considered
whether that sentence in Section 7501 limits the trust created by the
prior sentence to the same status as a tax in bankruptcy. If that limi-
tation is imposed on Section 7501 (a), then the government's super-
priority must fail, for as the court suggested earlier in its opinion, "It
is well settled that, absent such a trust, taxes incurred during a Chapter
XI arrangement enjoy only a pro rata first priority with all other ad-
ministrative expenses under Section 64(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy
Act. 20
It is not difficult to imagine how the previous cases failed to reach
this issue. City of New York v. Rassner,2 1 the leading case, dealt with
a law which was not limited in this manner. The cases which followed
cited Rassner as being factually indistinguishable, although they dealt
with Section 7501 or its predecessor. The factual similarity of those
cases to Rassner may have caused those courts to overlook this essen-
tial difference.
The Third Circuit recognized this limitation on the government's
trust theory imposed by the second sentence of Section 7501 (a) in
In re Connecticut Motor Lines, Inc.22 In that case the government
sought to have the tax money withheld on wages earned prior to bank-
ruptcy, but paid subsequent to the filing of bankruptcy, declared a first
priority claim as an expense of administration, rather than a fourth
priority claim as "taxes legally due and owing" under 64(a)(4) of the
Bankruptcy Act. The court held that the taxes were not costs of ad-
ministration. In the alternative, the government argued, the tax claim
was entitled to a preferred position by virtue of Section 7501. The
Connecticut Motor Lines court said that contention was defeated by
the very language of Section 7501.
Thus, though such collections are considered by law to be held
in trust, that trust is subject to the same limitations as are the taxes
from which the trust arose. Here, that limitation is the structure
of the Bankruptcy Act, the fact that such trust fund can only be
collected in the instant case as a fourth priority matter. 23
The Randall court also cited a district court case which has upset the
government's trust theory. In re Green 4 involved substantially the
same facts as Randall. The Green decision also noted the authorities
supporting the government, but chose to follow the Connecticut Motor
20. 419 F.2d at 1070, citing Missouri v. Earhart, 111 F.2d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 1949)
and cases cited therein.
21. 127 F.2d 703 (8th Cir. 1940).
22. 336 F.2d 96 (3rd Cir. 1964).
23. 336 F.2d at 107-108.
24. 264 F. Supp. 849 (D. Col. 1967).
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Lines construction of Section 7501. The court noted: "So construed
there is no conflict between § 7501 (a) and § 64 (a) of the Bankruptcy
Act".25
In Nicholas v. United States28 the Supreme Court was called upon to
decide whether the United States was entitled to post-bankruptcy inter-
est on taxes withheld during a superseded arrangement. After having
noted that the general rule has been to suspend interest on taxes after
the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, the Court did not feel compelled
by Section 7501 (a) to alter that result. While specifically limiting
its holding to the interest on the withheld tax money (assets in the estate
were sufficient to pay all costs of administration) the Court's language
seems to favor the Randall conclusion with regard to the principal of the
taxes.
The second sentence of § 7501 (a) specifically provides that
interest on such a trust fund is collectible in the same manner as
the taxes from which the fund arose. Since we have already de-
termined that no interest on any of the taxes here in question ac-
crues beyond the period of the arrangement proceeding, no interest
could accumulate on a trust fund composed of the withholding
and cabaret taxes. 27
In further support of the Randall conclusion as to the scope of Section
7501 (a), it is helpful to examine the circumstances which existed when
the predecessor to that section was enacted. Section 7501 (a) is de-
rived unchanged from an Act of May 10, 1934,28 and was carried over
in the 1938 Code as 26 U.S.C.A. § 3661, and in the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code as 26 U.S.C.A. § 7501. In Nolte v. Hudson Navigation
Co.,29 decided in 1925, the Second Circuit held that the government's
claim against a navigation company for transportation taxes collected
by it was not a tax claim but rather an ordinary debt since the debtor
acted as a mere conduit for payment. As a result of this conclusion,
the government's claim was not entitled to the priority in bankruptcy
afforded a "tax", nor was the government able to avail itself of the
procedures established for the creation of a tax lien. It was not until
the late 1930's that the Supreme Court recognized the dual liability in-
herent in such taxes and began reversing decisions which followed
Nolte.a0
25. 264 F. Supp. at 851.
26. 384 U.S. 678 (1966).
27. 384 U.S. at 691.
28. Act of May 10, 1934, c 277, § 607, 48 STAT. 768.
29. 8 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1925).
30. New York City v. Goldstein, 299 U.S. 522 (1937). United States v. Feiring,
313 U.S. 283 (1941). The basic argument for calling the amount of tax money col-
lected or withheld a debt rather than a tax in the hands of the collecting agent was
that the individual from whom the tax was collected or withheld was the taxpayer,
365
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It, thus, follows that the intention of the legislature in its 1934 enact-
ment of the predecessor to Section 7501 (a) was to give taxes withheld
or collected the status of a "tax" in the hands of the collection agent.
The Senate and House Committee reports cited in Randall confirm this
position." The Randall application of Section 7501 resolves the con-
flict in the two statutes by leaving undisturbed the favorable collection
procedures provided for by Section 7501, while giving deference to
"the policy decision of Congress reflected in Section 64 as to the relative
merits of various claims upon the bankrupt estate. 13 2
While determination of this issue was conclusive of the case, the
Randall court proceeded to a second ground for its decision. If the
conflict between Section 7501 of the Internal Revenue Code and
64(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Act was not resolved by construction, the
priorities established by the Bankruptcy Act would still prevail. In
New York v. Saperss the Supreme Court said:
[The Bankruptcy Act] was early held to take into consideration
'the whole range of indebtedness of the bankrupt, national, state,
and individual,' Guarantee Co. v. Title Guaranty Co., 224 U.S.
152, 160, and to have been passed 'with the United States in the
mind of Congress;' Davis v. Pringle, 268 U.S. 315, 317. We do
not believe the Revenue Act of 1924 and similar enactments were
intended to amend the comprehensive scheme of the Bankruptcy
Act. .. 4
The Randall court cited an ample line of authority suggesting that
in bankruptcy matters the Bankruptcy Act supersedes all other legisla-
tion and its priorities should control.35 In City of New York v. Rass-
and the collecting or withholding party was simply an agent for collection, thus a
debtor in regard to taxes collected. The Supreme Court in Feiring noted that if the
seller in that case had failed to collect the tax, he would remain liable for the amount
of the tax. Thus, that amount is a tax owed to the city from the seller's standpoint
as well as the buyer's. The buyer is primarily liable for the tax and the seller sec-
ondarily liable. The decisions giving amounts collected or withheld tax status, however,
occurred after the predecessor to § 7501 had used other means to obtain tax status
for those payments.
31. Senate Committee Report, S. REP. No. 558, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., p. 53 (1934),
provides:
Under existing law the liability of the person collecting and withholding
the taxes to pay over the amount is merely a debt, and he cannot be treated as
a trustee or proceeded against by distraint. Section [7501(a)] ...impresses
the amount of taxes withheld or collected with a trust and makes applicable
for the enforcement of the Government's claim the administrative provisions
for assessment and collection of taxes.
See also H.R. CONF. REFP. No. 1385, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. p.32 (1934).
In subsequent revisions of the Internal Revenue Code the tax trust provision was
carried over without comment.
32. 419 F.2d at 1072.
33. 336 U.S. 328 (1949).
34. 336 U.S. at 340-341 n.18.
35. 419 F.2d at 1072 citing Guarantee Title & Trust Co. v. Guaranty & Surety Co.,
224 U.S. 152 (1912); Davis v. Pringle, 268 U.S. 315 (1925); Missouri v. Ross, 299 U.S.
366
Vol. 1: 359
Case Comments
ner8s, however, the court found that the generalities of Section
64(a)(1) did not reflect an overriding policy of the Bankruptcy Act.
Nevertheless, in Nicholas v. United States, cited earlier, the Supreme
Court, while withholding determination of the issue confronted in Ran-
dall, suggested that the policies inherent in Section 64(a)(1) were more
than mere generalities:
We need not here determine whether, with regard to the principal
of those taxes, the general language of § 7501 (a) overrides the
strong policy of § 64 a (1) of the Bankruptcy Act, which establishes
a sharply defined priority that places all expenses of administration
on a parity, including claims for taxes.8 7
Despite the strong line of authority which gives Section 64(a) and
the Bankruptcy Act, in general, a preferential status in bankruptcy mat-
ters, it is not necessary to assume that Rassner misread Section 64(a).
The distinction which Rassner draws upon is the status of the statutory
trust in bankruptcy. While Section 64(a) sets out the priorities ac-
corded in bankruptcy, other claims may be entitled to satisfaction prior
to and without regard to those priorities. A valid lien, subject to re-
strictions, will receive payment before distribution in bankruptcy occurs.
While Congress has the power to terminate or limit this preference under
the Bankruptcy Act, and in fact has limited it, absent such restrictions, a
lien will be paid prior to expenses of administration.38
In a similar fashion, property which a bankrupt holds in trust for
another goes directly to the beneficiary and is not subject to distribution
to creditors. 39 The reason is that while the bankrupt held legal title
to the property, he did not possess the beneficial interest in the property
and thus the property equitably should not be considered a part of his
estate upon bankruptcy. The trustee takes legal title subject to the
beneficiary's interest. As the Rassner court noted, an overriding policy
of the Bankruptcy Act could make even trust property subject to the
priorities of Section 64(a). However, that court saw no such policy
evidenced by the terms of Section 64(a). In regard to a common law
trust, that observation is beyond dispute. The Randall decision, in
this writer's opinion, does not compel subordination of the common
law trust. However, both Rassner and Randall dealt with a statutory
trust, a trust created not by the relationship of the parties but by statu-
72, 76 (1936); United States v. Key, 407 F.2d 635, 638 (7th Cir. 1969); and United
States v. Kalishman, 346 F.2d 514, 517 (8th Cir. 1965).
36. See note 8, supra.
37. 384 U.S. at 691.
38. 3A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 64.02 at 2068 (14th ed. 1969).
39. 3A COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY 64.02 at 2069 (1969) and 4A COLLIER ON
BANKRuPTcY % 70.25 at 342 (1969).
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tory enactment. While the Randall court did not expressly differentiate,
that distinction can, and perhaps should, be viewed as the basis for the
Randall decision.40
The preference accorded a common law trust in bankruptcy distribu-
tion has had long-standing application.4' However, where the trust is
not created by the relationship of the parties but by statutory enactment
it must come under more careful scrutiny. Where the trust is not based
upon established trust principles, but upon legislative enactment, the
possibility exists that it may be a mere device to obtain a priority not in-
tended by the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. If that is the case,
then preferred distribution of the trust might be held to be against the
clear policy of the Bankruptcy Act.4 2  Collier on Bankruptcy advo-
cates this treatment of the statutory trust:
In view of the elimination of all state-created priorities but one
in § 64 a (5) and the avowed purpose in § 67 c to implement the
policy of § 64 a by striking at statutory liens indistinguishable from
priorities, there is reason for treating the statutory trust in the same
way as its functional equivalent, the statutory lien, so far as bank-
ruptcy is concerned. 43
Unlike Rassner, where the statute creating the trust was a city law,
the Randall court had to determine whether Section 7501 (a) or Section
64(a) more clearly reflected the policy of Congress since both were
federal laws (assuming arguendo, as the court did, that the two statutes
were in conflict). In addition to the rule of construction which gives
the Bankruptcy Act priority in bankruptcy matters, the Randall court
relied on the trend of legislative enactments involving the Bankruptcy
Act as reflecting the strong policy of the Act to place all costs of ad-
ministration, whether for taxes or for other administrative expenses, on
a parity. The court traced the development of the Bankruptcy Act since
1926, noting that Congress has continually and systematically reduced
the priority afforded federal tax claims while raising the priority of ad-
ministrative expense claims.
40. The Randall court displayed cognizance of the objections to the statutory trust
by citing 3A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 2070, 2071 n.27 where those objections were
discussed.
41. 4A COLLIER, supra note 39, at 70.25 at 339, 340 n.3.
42. Another approach would be to hold that a trust never existed where the trust
is a mere device, despite the fact a particular statute calls it a trust. The problem, as
the Rassner court noted, is that decisions have generally applied state law to deter-
mine whether or not a trust existed. Thus, a federal bankruptcy court could not "go
behind the trust" if state law controls and a state statute calls a particular relationship
a trust. However, for arguments against applying state law, see 4A COLLLER, supra
note 39, at 67.25 at 351 (14th ed. 1969).
43. 4 COLLIER supra note 39, at 351. See also H.R. REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1952), p.13.
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Reasons for the legislative preference accorded costs of administra-
tion over other claims can be discerned in the Senate Report on the 1952
Amendment to Section 64(a)(1), 44 which gave costs of administration
of an ensuing bankruptcy proceeding priority over costs of administra-
tion of a superseded proceeding:
Unless provision is made for payment of the costs and expenses
necessary to liquidate, administer and close the estate in the ensuing
bankruptcy proceeding, ahead of all prior incurred and unpaid
administration costs and expenses, there is always danger of a
breakdown of administration. There should be assurance to the
trustee in the ensuing proceeding that the costs and expenses in-
curred by him, such as bond and insurance premiums, costs of
conducting a public sale and compensation for his services and for
the services of his attorney, will be paid out of the assets liqui-
dated and administered by him ahead of the prior unpaid costs and
expenses. 45
Thus, the policy of 64(a)(1) is premised on a strong factual reality:
if the ability of the trustee to recover his costs in administering the
bankrupt's estate is compromised, there is a danger that the efficient
administration of the bankruptcy proceeding will be inhibited. Further-
more, on equitable principles alone, it would seem that the service the
trustee performs for all creditors in administering the estate should be
compensated for, at least to the extent of funds expended. The statutorily
created trust, when coupled with the liberal tracing requirements im-
posed by Rassner and subsequent cases, often produces an equitable
anomaly. For example, where none of the trust assets are present in
the estate at bankruptcy and the sole assets in the estate are the product
of the trustee's activity (i.e., by selling the debtor's chattels or invali-
dating a mortgage), the trustee under the Rassner line of decisions may
not be able to recoup the expenses of the sale. 46 Part of the difficulty in-
volves the relaxation in Rassner of the general requirement that the ben-
eficiary must trace trust property in the debtor's assets. 47
Once the trust relationship has been established, one claiming as
a cestui que trust thereunder must identify the trust as property
in the bankrupt estate, and if such fund or property has been min-
gled with the general property of the bankrupt, sufficiently trace
the trust property. 48
Rassner made an exception to this requirement where the mingling
44. SEN. REP. No. 1395 on S. 2234, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
45. Id. at p. 5.
46. See In re S.T. Foods, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
47. Randall did not deal with this issue because its determination that the Section
7501 tax trust did not create a super-priority precluded that discussion.
48. 4A COLLIER, supra note 39, at 70.25, p. 354 n.44 for cases cited.
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took place during an arrangement, since the bankrupt was acting as an
officer of court and subject to the control of the court. This would
seem to be a valid equitable approach with regard to the common law
forms of trusts. However, here again it seems that a distinction should
have been made with regard to a statutory trust. The statutory trust
bears even less resemblance to the traditionally accepted trust forms
where there has never been a distinguishable trust res. Where the trust
is composed of taxes "withheld" from employees, often no res ever ex-
isted. Frequently, the employer facing bankruptcy makes payments to
his employees by deducting the amount of taxes and paying the net
amount without ever having had funds to cover the gross amount paid.
Tax money is not "withheld" in the true sense when, in fact, it never
was in existence. This is distinguishable from the case where a trust
res existed and was commingled by the trustee. Even apart from the
tracing requirements, it might be argued in the former example that a
valid trust never existed because of the absence of a trust res.4 9 A more
fundamental argument, however, (which may have been implicit in
Randall), is that where the statutory trust relationship, considering all
the facts, bears so little resemblance to the ordinary trust relationship
that it can be termed a mere device to obtain a priority not provided
for by the Bankruptcy Act, that trust is contrary to the policies of the
Act. This approach would require a case-by-case analysis of the
trust in question. If the particular facts of a given situation indicate
that a trust created by statute bears little resemblance to other trust
relationships, it would be held to be inapplicable in bankruptcy as con-
trary to the policy of the Bankruptcy Act.
In summary, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States
v. Randall held that the United States was not entitled to a super-pri-
ority in bankruptcy by virtue of Section 7501 of the Internal Revenue
Code. The court decided that the second sentence of Section 7501
makes the tax trust subject to the same limitations as the taxes from
which it arose, and therefore, the trust would be subject to the priorities
of Section 64(a) of the Bankruptcy Act which gives taxes incurred dur-
ing a Chapter XI arrangement only a pro rata first priority with other
administrative expenses. The court also decided that even if Section
7501 were not so limited by its language, its preference would be over-
ridden by the strong policy underlying Section 64(a) of the Bank-
rupty Act.
The first ground of the Randall decision is noteworthy in that the
49. See note 42, supra, for difficulties inherent in that argument.
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Seventh Circuit's decision on the construction of Section 7501 is in
conflict with the decisions of three other circuits. However, the second
ground in Randall, taken in its broadest application, could have a far
greater significance.
It may be argued that the second ground for the Randall decision is
a mere resolution of an inconsistency between two federal statutes, Sec-
tion 64(a) of the Bankruptcy Act and Section 7501 of the Internal
Revenue Code, and that it should be limited in its future application
to cases involving Section 7501. In that event the court's discussion
of the second ground would add nothing to the scope of its decision
and would have been unnecessary. However, the court's emphasis
upon the strong policy of the Bankruptcy Act and the Act's supremacy
in bankruptcy, and its rejection of the Rassner rationale, even though
the Rassner decision did not involve a federal tax statute, seems to indi-
cate a broader application than merely cases involving Section 7501.
It seems likely that Randall is authority in the Seventh Circuit for the
rejection of any statutory trust device, either federal or state, which
creates priorities contrary to those established in Section 64(a) of the
Bankruptcy Act. Taken in this light, the Randall decision is very sig-
nificant in that it establishes a court created limitation on the applica-
tion of a statutory trust in bankruptcy. The decision could be the
stepping stone for judicial limitations upon the statutory trust device,
similar to the legislative limitations imposed upon the statutory lien by
Sections 64(a)(5) and 67(c) of the Bankruptcy Act.5"
The Supreme Court may be called upon to resolve this conflict be-
tween the circuits. In light of its dicta in Nicholas v. United States,51
it is submitted that the Supreme Court is likely to concur with the Seventh
Circuit's construction of Section 7501. The court, thus, would not be
compelled to consider whether the policy of Section 64(a)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Act precludes the creation of contrary priorities by means
of a statutory trust. It would thereby tacitly defer to Congress to clarify
the status of the statutory trust in bankruptcy.
EUGENE J. JEKA
50. § 64(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 104(a)(5) (1964), elimi-
nated all state-created priorities with one exception (rent). § 67(c)(2), 11 U.S.C.A.§ 107(c)(2), invalidated statutory liens where the property was not levied upon or
in the possession of the creditor before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. "The
adoption of § 64(a)(5) and § 67c of the Bankruptcy Act was intended to make
clear that state rules of priority of distribution must yield in bankruptcy cases to that
prescribed by the Act." Elliot v. Bumb, 356 F.2d 749, 754 (9th Cir. 1966).
51. 384 U.S. at 690-691.
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